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I. INTRODUCTION
It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Caperton
v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.' without hearing some variant of the following response:
"I can't believe it was as close as it was." And whether one is chatting with his
next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life, or
discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert,' nearly everyone seems to
agree: Caperton was an "easy" case and the fact that four justices dissented
* J.D., Stanford Law School; Fellow, Stanford Center on the Legal Profession. I am particularly grateful
to Samuel Bray, Nora Freeman Engstrom, and Amanda Packel for their helpful comments.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
2. The terms "recusal" and "disqualification" are used interchangeably throughout this Article. These
terms originally had slightly different meanings, with "recusal" referring to withdrawal at the judge's discretion
and "disqualification" meaning exclusion by force of law. Modernly, however, this distinction is almost never
recognized. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 43, 45 (1970); see RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 1.1 at 3-4 (2d ed. 2007).
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indicates that something is terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the
issue of judicial impartiality to the national spotlight, but it has also triggered a
firestorm: Congress has held hearings examining judicial recusals in light of
Caperton;' states have grappled with new recusal rules and procedures, as well as
changes to state judicial elections; and law schools around the country have held
conferences and symposia dedicated solely to Caperton and judicial ethics.'
Together with the Court's earlier ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White6 and this year's decision in Citizens United v. FEC,7 Caperton is part of a
trilogy that will shape our views of judicial independence and accountability for
years to come.
This Article argues that Caperton is often misunderstood and concludes that
Caperton was not an easy case, in large part because the Court rejected the well-
established appearances-based recusal standard in favor of a probability-based
one that examines the likelihood of actual bias. While Caperton's changes to the
law are seemingly minor, this Article asserts that these changes, in fact, affect the
recusal landscape more than is or has been appreciated. Furthermore, Caperton's
probability-based standard may contain a blueprint for an improved recusal
framework across state and federal judiciaries.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II explains the role of appearances,
both historically and currently, in recusal decisions in the United States. Today,
appearance of partiality, rather than actual fairness, is the key factor in judicial
recusal under both the federal recusal statutes and state judicial codes. This was
not always so.
Part III argues that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Caperton limited,
if not excluded, the role of appearances from its due process analysis. Some
scholars, judges, and commentators, however, have wrongly interpreted
Caperton's "probability of bias" standard to be coterminous with the "appearance
of bias" standard that currently controls recusal under federal statutes and state
judicial codes. This Article will explain why this interpretation is incorrect and
why the Court's opinion should be read to reject an appearance-based
disqualification standard under the Constitution's Due Process Clause.
3. On December 10, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Competition
held a hearing on issues related to the Caperton case. See Examining the State of Judicial Recusals After
Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm.
On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
4. Contentious debate regarding the appropriate response to Caperton took place in a number of states,
including West Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton
Era, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 787 (2010) (summarizing the state court reforms in the year following Caperton).
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 215 (2009);
Georgetown Law School Conference: State Courts and U.S. Supreme Court Rulings: Will Caperton and
Citizens United Change the Way States Pick Judges? (Jan. 26, 2010); Seattle University Conference: State
Judicial Independence-A National Concern (Sept. 14, 2009).
6. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
7. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
8. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263(2009).
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The final part of this Article discusses the implications of adopting a
probability-based-rather than an appearance-based-recusal standard, and how
states can use Caperton, and recusal generally, to address the public's growing
concern about the impartiality of an elected judiciary. This Article argues that in
response to Caperton, states should change their recusal procedures and tailor
them to the newly-announced probability-based substantive standard for judicial
disqualification. In adopting these new recusal procedures, states should pay
special attention to appearances, ensuring that the newly-adopted procedure
creates an appearance of impartiality and fairness. As a result of greater emphasis
on the appearance of procedural fairness, public's confidence in the judiciary will
increase.
H. THE ROLE OF APPEARANCES IN JUDICIAL RECUSALS
In the United States, judicial recusal is largely about appearances. Under the
federal recusal statutes, as well as the state judicial codes, judges must recuse
themselves to avoid even the appearance of bias.9 Although universally accepted
throughout the United States today, this is a relatively new concept. Undoubtedly
the need for judicial impartiality was recognized in early Jewish, Roman, and
English law,o but there is virtually no evidence suggesting that mere appearance
of partiality prevented judges from participating in cases before the adoption of
an appearance-based recusal standard in the United States."
A. Federal Recusal Statutes
Judicial recusal was on the minds of our founding fathers at the time of this
nation's birth. In 1792, Congress passed the United States' first recusal statute.12
The legislation was narrowly drawn, narrowly interpreted, and did not even
prohibit judges from hearing cases in which they might have a bias for or against
9. FLAMM, supra note 2, §§ 5.6-5.6.1, at 118-19; Susan E. Liontas, Judicial Elections Have No Winners,
20 STETSON L. REv. 309, 312 (1990).
10. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5. Bracton set out the common law rule for disqualification in the
thirteenth century:
A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for refusal is a suspicion, which arises
from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent
or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his kinsman or a member of his household, or a table-
companion, or he has been his counsellor or his pleader in that cause or in another, or in any such
like capacity.
BRACTON, LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIUS ANGLIE 249 (Travers Twiss ed., 1883).
11. In 18th century England, for instance, the common-law recusal practice was exceedingly simple:
Only if he had a direct financial interest in the case was the judge to be presumed biased and disqualified. John
P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-12 (1947). This was the law at the time of the
colonization of America, rejecting the broader standard contained in BRACTON, supra note 10.
12. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278-79 (1792).
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a party.'3 The statute largely codified the common-law disqualification rules and
called for disqualification of district court judges who were "concerned in
interest," as well as those who had "been of counsel for either party., 1 4 Even in
the late nineteenth century, a judge was permitted to preside over a bankruptcy
proceeding despite his status as a creditor of the bankrupt."
Over the next two centuries, the federal recusal statute was amended and
shaped, often in response to high-profile scandals or controversies involving
federal judges. The federal statute that governs disqualification by any federal
court today, 28 U.S.C. § 455, is divided into two parts. 6 The first section (and for
our purposes the most relevant), § 455(a), is a general catch-all provision that
requires disqualification whenever "[a judge's] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."" It is now uncontroverted that this standard was intended to
promote not only the impartiality of the judiciary but also the public perception
of the impartiality of the judicial process.' As a result, a mere appearance of bias,
as viewed from the perspective of an objective observer, requires recusal.
B. ABA Codes of Judicial Conduct
While 28 U.S.C. § 455 is controlling only in federal courts, nearly every state
has adopted the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct.'9 The
Code, which applies to all full-time judges and all legal and quasi-legal
proceedings, addresses when judicial disqualification is necessary.20
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. In re Sime, 22. F. Cas. 145, 146 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No. 12,860).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
17. Id. § 455(a). The second section, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), enumerates certain specific factual situations
when recusal is required. For example, disqualification is mandatory when the judge "has ... personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" or if the judge previously served as the
lawyer, or had been a material witness, in the matter in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(l)-(2).
18. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974); see also S. Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973); Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 ("The general language of subsection (a) was designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective 'in his opinion'
standard with an objective test.").
19. In 1924, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the original Canons of
Judicial Ethics and over the course of the next five decades, a majority of states adopted them as well. In 1972,
the House of Delegates adopted more explicit standards of judicial conduct, which were followed closely by the
adoption of a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990. In February of 2007, the Model Code was
superseded by a revised Code adopted by the ABA House of Delegates. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2007) available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/approved_MCJC.html# (follow "ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, February 12, 2007" hyperlink). Today, forty-nine states have adopted the Code in one form or
another. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might
Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 55, 55 (2000).
20. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 19. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges
is another ethical code adopted and revised by the Judicial Conference of the United States that applies to most
federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. It does not, however, govern the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court because the Conference has no authority to create rules controlling the Supreme
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The Code imposes a general standard that is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Subsection (a) of rule 2.11 of the Code states: "A judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned . . . ." Impartiality means the "absence of bias or prejudice in
favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance
of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge."2 2 Although
the Code itself makes no mention of appearances, courts and commentators have
focused on the appearance of impropriety in their interpretation,23 leaving judges
with broad discretion in interpreting and applying this standard. 4 In short, the
Code and the federal disqualification statute are largely coterminous, and both
indirectly impose appearance-based recusal standards.
C. Due Process Clause
1. Pre-Caperton
Although the Constitution's Due Process Clause guarantees litigants a right
to have their cases heard and decided by fair and impartial judges,5 and the
Supreme Court has periodically held that prejudice or bias by the presiding judge
violates the litigant's constitutional rights,2 it has long been thought that the
Constitution mandates disqualification only in very limited circumstances.27 The
Supreme Court has explained that "matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy,
[and] remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion" rather than a constitutional recusal floor. 28 And until
Caperton, it was unclear whether improper appearances alone could rise to the
Court. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICs 375, 386 (2003).
21. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 19, at R. 2.11(a). The rule goes on to list specific
situations in which the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed, although the list is not exhaustive.
Id. at R. 2.11.
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (2007)
23. Abramson, supra note 19, at 55 n.2 ("Whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned
is also referred to as the appearance of partiality, the appearance of impropriety, or negative appearances.").
24. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 679-80 (2005).
25. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
26. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (explaining that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.").
27. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("All questions of judicial qualification may not
involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest,
would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion."); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904
(1997) ("[M]ost questions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform
standard."); Aetna Life Insruace Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986) ("The Due Process Clause demarks
only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.").
28. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270 (1884)).
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level of a due process violation. In fact, historically, there have been only two
types of cases where the Due Process Clause was held to require recusal.
First, the Due Process Clause has been read to require disqualification when
the judge has a financial interest in the litigation. The leading case is Tumey v.
Ohio.29 In Tumey, an Ohio statute authorized judges to receive court costs
assessed against convicted defendants, but not against those who were
acquitted.o The Court held this incentive scheme created too much partiality and
invalidated the statute on due process grounds, explaining that due process is
violated when a judge is "paid for his service only when he convicts the
defendant."" This result is neither controversial nor surprising-a judge should
not be incentivized to reach a particular result.32
However, a judge's interest need not be a direct financial one. For example,
in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, the Court held that a mayor may not preside as
a judge over ordinance violations and traffic offenses when the court-assessed
fines for such transgressions would be contributed to the town's budget.33 While
the mayor's salary did not depend on his conviction rate, the mayor still had a
financial incentive to convict-he was responsible for the town's revenue
production.4 That incentive, the Court held, is inconsistent with due process.
Similar incentives were held to violate due process in Aetna Life Insurance
36Co. v. Lavoie. There, Alabama Supreme Court Justice Embry ruled in favor of
the plaintiff on his bad-faith claim against Aetna.37 It turned out, however, that
Justice Embry himself had filed two comparable actions against other insurance
companies making similar allegations and seeking punitive damages while the
plaintiffs action against Aetna was still pending." The Supreme Court held that
Justice Embry's refusal to recuse himself was in violation of the Due Process
Clause. 9 As with Tumey and Ward, the judge's decision furthered his own
financial interests, allowing him to act as "a judge in his own case."
29. Id. at 523.
30. Id. at 519-20.
31. Id. at 531.
32. Ronald Rotunda has likened this motivation to convict a defendant to contingency fees for judges.
Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 249 (2010).
33. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). Between 1964 and 1968, the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees that the court
had imposed provided nearly one-half of the Village's annual revenue. Id. at 58
34. Id. at 60.
35. Id.
36. 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 817.
39. Id. at 824. The reason recusal was necessary was not because of Justice Embry's ill-will towards
insurance companies. Rather, the opinion rendered by Justice Embry "had the clear and immediate effect of
enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own case." Id.
40. Id.
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Second, the Court has held that due process forbids a judge from wearing too
many hats. For example, in In re Murchison, the Court found a violation of the
Due Process Clause although the judge did not have a personal pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the case.4' Rather, the judge had served as a one-person grand
jury before presiding over a hearing to determine that two of the testifying
witnesses were guilty of contempt.42 This procedure, the Court held, ran afoul of
43due process.
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania is also instructive.4 There, the defendant verbally
attacked the presiding judge45 and continuously interrupted court proceedings to
the point where the defendant had to be removed from the courtroom.4 The
Supreme Court held that when the defendant is charged with criminal contempt,
he "should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the
contemnor." 4 7
2. Post-Caperton
Such was the state of recusal law under the Due Process Clause until
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 48 In Caperton, West Virginia Supreme Court
Justice Brent Benjamin cast the deciding vote to overturn a trial court's decision
against the appellant, Massey Coal Company.49 Before Justice Benjamin was
elected to the court, Massey's CEO, Don Blankenship, provided generous
support to his election campaign.o Indeed, Blakenship contributed more to
Benjamin's campaign than all other donors combined (a total of approximately
$3 million), all while his lawyers were preparing the Caperton case for appeal.
After refusing Caperton's recusal requests, Justice Benjamin voted with the
majority in a 3-2 decision overturning the trial court's verdict."
41. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
42. Id. at 134-37.
43. Id.
44. 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971).
45. See id. at 456-57 (noting that the defendant referred to the judge as a "hatchet man for the State," a
"dirty sonofabitch" and a "dirty, tyrannical old dog.").
46. Id. at 462.
47. Id. at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a lawyer for contempt
committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity to be heard in defense or mitigation. See
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499-500 (1974). In such circumstances, a different judge should conduct the
trial in place of the judge who initiated the contempt. Id. at 501-502.
48. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
49. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008) (Benjamin, J. concurring).
50. During the campaign, Mr. Blankenship spent approximately $3 million to help Justice Benjamin.
However, only $1000, the West Virginia limit for direct campaign contributions, was given directly to
Benjamin. The rest of the money funded a tax-exempt organization, "And For The Sake Of The Kids," which
was formed to defeat incumbent Justice McGraw, and newspaper and television advertising attacking McGraw.
See Brief for Petitioners at 5-8, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No.08-22).
51. Id.
52. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008) (Benjamin, J. concurring).
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The United States Supreme Court reversed; holding that Justice Benjamin's
failure to recuse himself violated Caperton's right to due process." In reaching
this decision, the Court relied on the principles announced in its prior decisions
and applied them to the facts of the case at hand.54 Quoting Tumey, the Court
once again announced that due process requires judicial recusal when the
circumstances "offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."" The Court explained that
"when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or
directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or
56imminent," the risk of actual bias violates due process.
After Caperton, little doubt remains that recusal is required under the Due
Process Clause, even when the judge has no personal interest in the outcome of
the litigation and did not act as both a judge and a prosecutor or witness in the
same case. But the question remains: What about appearances? Can an
appearance of bias rise to the level of a due-process violation? 7
III. DUE PROCESS AND THE "APPEARANCE OF BIAS"
A. Are Appearance of Bias and Probability of Bias Synonymous?
As Part II shows, recusal for almost all judges in the United States-at the
state and federal levels-is governed by an appearance-driven standard. Of
course, actual bias is prohibited as well, but rarely does a disqualification inquiry
turn on a judge's actual bias. This is in large part due to the fact that judges
deciding their own recusal motions tend to downplay the existence of actual bias.
Furthermore, the appearance-of-bias test does not require parties to argue for
actual bias." But does the Due Process Clause require only an absence of actual
bias? Or does it prohibit even its appearance? Justice Benjamin himself took the
position that due process does not require recusal based solely on the appearance
of impropriety and at least some state courts agreed.
53. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259-67.
54. Id. at 2260-2262.
55. Id. at 2261-62.
56. Id. at 2263-64.
57. Compare Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep't. of Corrs., 31 F.3d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[B]ad
appearances alone do not require disqualification. Reality controls over uninformed perception"), with Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) ("Due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the
appearance of bias.").
58. GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS (2009) (discussing
the differences between recusal standards based on the appearance of bias, on the one hand, and actual bias, on
the other).
59. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252; see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008)
(Benjamin, J. concurring); see also State v. Canales, 916 A.2d 767, 781 (Conn. 2007) ("[A] judge's failure to
disqualify himself or herself will implicate the due process clause only when the right to disqualification arises
72
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In Caperton, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve the issue. But by the
time the case came up for oral argument, it was unclear whether Caperton had
abandoned the argument that an appearance of bias alone was enough to trigger a
due process violation. During oral argument, two interesting exchanges about the
role of appearances under the Due Process Clause took place between the justices
and counsel for Massey. First, Justice Stevens expressed incredulity that
appearances alone could not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Frey, is it your position that the appearance
of impropriety could never be strong enough to raise a constitutional
issue?
MR. FREY: Well, we might have appearance of impropriety
overlapping with conditions that would justify-
JUSTICE STEVENS: I'm assuming appearances only. Are you saying
that appearances without any actual proof of bias could never be
sufficient as a constitutional matter?
MR. FREY: I think we are.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Is that your position?
MR. FREY: We are saying that the Due Process Clause does not exist
to protect the integrity or reputation of the State judicial systems.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why-
JUSTICE STEVENS: That's not an answer to my question.
MR. FREY: Well, I thought I said -
JUSTICE STEVENS: Supposing, for example, the judge had
campaigned on the ground that he would issue favorable rulings to the
United Mine Workers, and the United Mine Workers campaigned,
raising money saying, we want to get a judge who will rule in our favor
in all the cases we're interested in. Would that create an appearance of
impropriety?
MR. FREY: Well-
JUSTICE STEVENS: Or take another example. The Chief Justice
asked what if there are ten members of a trade association and would
all-and they all contributed to get a judge to vote in their favor in a case
that involved a conspiracy charge among the-charged the ten of them
for violations of the Sherman Act, something like that. And if all ten of
them raise money publicly for the very purpose of getting a judge who
from actual bias on the part of that judge."); Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 148 P.3d 1247, 1260 (Idaho 2006)
("[W]e require a showing of actual bias before disqualifying a decision maker even when a litigant maintains a
decision maker has deprived the proceedings of the appearance of fairness."). But see Allen v. Rutledge, 139
S.W.3d 491, 498 (Ark. 2003) ("Due process requires not only that a judge be fair, but that he also appear to be
fair.") (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Brandenburg, 114 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Ky. 2003) ("[T]here need not
be an actual claim of bias or impropriety levied, but the mere appearance that such an impropriety might exist is
enough to implicate due process concerns."); State v. Brown, 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Haw. 1989) (concluding
that due process requires that justice "satisfy the appearance of justice").
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would rule favorably in their favor, that would clearly create a very
extreme appearance of impropriety. Would that be sufficient, in your
judgment, to raise a constitutional issue?
MR. FREY: If you were-if-if you thought there was no basis for
believing there was actual bias, but it looked bad-
JUSTICE STEVENS: No, it would meet the test in the-in the judges'
brief of an average judge would be tempted under the circumstances.
That's the test that the Conference of Chief Justices judges-
MR. FREY: That I don't-
JUSTICE STEVENS: And do you think that could ever, just
appearance, could ever raise a due process issue?
MR. FREY: No, I don't think just appearance could ever raise a due
process issue.
Later in the argument, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the two phrases-
appearance of bias and probability of bias-are synonymous.
MR. FREY: I don't-I think, first of all, the Petitioner has not
advanced on the merits in this case an appearance standard. A lot of
the-
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would you please clarify that? Because I was
taking appearance, likelihood, probability as all synonyms . . . .6
The questioning suggests that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg-two of the
five Justices in the Caperton majority-believe that (a) the mere appearance of
bias can rise to the level of a due process violation and (b) that "appearance of
bias" and "probability of bias" are interchangeable terms. Perhaps as a
consequence, some scholars and commentators read the majority opinion in
Caperton to hold that the appearance of impartiality may violate the Due Process
Clause.62
60. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-29, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009)
(No. 08-22), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/08-22.pdf
61. Id. at 34-35.
62. Cf. Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal
and Due Process, 28 Miss. C. L. REv. 359, 363-70 (2009) (discussing the terms "appearance," "perception,"
and "probability" and treating the terms as synonymous); Gerard J. Clark, Caperton's New Right to
Independence in Judges, 59 Drake L. Rev. 661, 707 (2010) ("The Court's due process standard, however, is
really no different than the standards in recusal statutes and judicial codes."). See also Joan Biskupic, Court
Says Judges Must Avoid Appearance of Bias with Donors, USA TODAY, June 9, 2009, at 2A; Susan Kinniry,
Demise of Judicial Elections and Lessons from the Lonestar State, June 20, 2010, http://judgesonmerit.
org/2010/02/18/ demise-of-judicial-elections-and-lessons-from-the-lonestar-state/ (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) ("Caperton plainly lays out that even the appearance of impartiality due to large campaign
contributions may violate due process.").
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Such a reading is incorrect. The majority opinion focuses not on appearances
but rather on the probability that Justice Benjamin is actually biased.63 And
probability of bias is not the same as appearance of bias, although many
commentators-and even Justice Ginsburg-conflate the two. But the difference
is crucial: An appearance-based standard focuses on the public's perception of
the fairness of the court, while a probability-based standard centers on a
reasonable judge's likelihood of actual bias. The subject of the former inquiry is
a member of the public; the subject of the latter inquiry is the judge in question.
These are two very different tests, and the relevant factors in determining
whether the test is met may be wildly different.
Two reasons support the view that the Court's majority opinion adopts the
latter approach." First, the Court makes little mention of appearances throughout
its opinion. Instead, it embraces the old constitutional test that focuses on
"whether the contributor's influence on the election under all the circumstances
'would offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to. . . lead him not to
hold the balance nice, clear, and true."' 6 In other words, the spotlight is directly
on the judge, not on the observations of the public, which is consistent with a
probability-based disqualification standard. The majority opinion only uses the
word "appearance" in two contexts: First, when discussing Justice Benjamin's
own decision," and second, when explaining that most states have implemented
an even more stringent, appearance-based standard for recusal." In fact, the Court
explicitly stated that the states' appearance-based codes "provide more protection
than due process requires."
Second, the majority explained that "[n]ot every campaign contribution by a
litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal
.... ."9 Rather, the Court held Caperton is "an exceptional case."O But as
explained in greater detail below, there is nothing exceptional about this case
from an appearance-of-bias perspective. Had the Court intended to adopt an
appearance-based test for judicial recusal, Blankenship's contributions to Justice
63. See, e.g., Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 ("On these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to
an unconstitutional level.").
64. Cf Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the
Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.
bepress.com/jeffrey-stempel/2 (follow "Download the Paper" hyperlink) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (arguing that the Supreme Court did not go far enough to make the due process recusal standard
congruent with the prevailing state and federal recusal standards).
65. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260-61, 2264-65.
66. Id. at 2258.
67. Id. at 2266 ("One must also take into account the judicial reforms the States have implemented to
eliminate even the appearance of partiality.") (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 2267.
69. Id. at 2263.
70. Id.
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Benjamin would not be seen as extraordinary because even minor contributions
can create an appearance of bias.
B. Why Caperton is Not an Easy Case
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Caperton, various
commentators expressed surprise that the Court was closely divided. Charles
Geyh, an expert in judicial ethics who has written prolifically about judicial bias,
and Stephen Gillers, a leading ethics scholar, both commented that the case was
"easy."72 Presumably, this is because of the large sum of money contributed by
the defendant's CEO." Also focusing on the size of the contribution, Lawrence
Lessig wrote "if contributions were small ... the fact that money was contributed
to a judge's campaign could not lead anyone reasonably to believe that the
contribution would affect any particular result." 74
Indeed, Caperton is an easy case if the Court is applying an appearance-
based recusal standard. Of course a large contribution or expenditure by one of
the litigants to elect a judge creates an appearance of bias. But wouldn't a "mini-
Caperton" also be an easy case? Wouldn't a contribution of even a few hundred
dollars to Justice Benjamin by Blankenship also create an appearance of bias?
After all, research shows that even a small contribution-a contribution too small
to play any role in the election's outcome-may create an appearance of
impropriety. Even more surprising is a recent study showing that merely
offering a campaign contribution creates an appearance of bias and partiality. In
other words, relatively minor contributions-even those that are rejected-may
produce an appearance of bias and lead some to question the judge's
impartiality.78
71. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
72. Marcia Coyle, Hot Recusal Case Debated: Justice Will Decide What Standard Due Process
Requires, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=120242
8674548 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
73. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
74. Lawrence Lessig, Comment, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 12 HARV. L. REV.
104, 105-106 (2009).
75. Professor Gillers seems to think that is exactly what the Court did in Caperton. He explained that
"[t]he appearance of justice is just as important as justice." Coyle, supra note 72.
76. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial
Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals?, 23-24, (Oct. 19, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract_id=1428723 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). According to a 2009 Harris Interactive poll conducted for Justice at Stake,
eighty-five percent of all voters believe judges should not hear cases in which a litigant spent $50,000 or more
to help elect them. Justice at Stake Campaign, Financial Limit Survey, http://staging.justiceatstake.siteviz
enterprise.conmedia/cms/Justiceat_.Stake_.Campaign-FinalTab_44BOAF6D36565.pdf (last visited Oct. 9
2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
77. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 76, at 23-24, 30.
78. The Talmud proscribes that "even a judge who had refused a trivial favor from a litigant might find
himself leaning in [the litigant's] favor." John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62
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Were a judge required to recuse herself every time a campaign contribution
created an appearance of bias towards a contributor to her campaign, a
contributor against her campaign, or even somebody whose contribution the
judge declined, judges would be unable to adjudicate the very cases that they
were elected to decide. Furthermore, if recusal were necessary every time a
contributor appeared in front of a judge, judicial elections would become a major
obstacle to the operation of the justice system. States created-and people
overwhelmingly support-judicial elections to hold judges accountable for their
decisions, and to strengthen the separation of power between the legislative and
judicial branches.79
An elected judiciary assumes that there will be campaign supporters and
contributors-many of whom will be the very parties who will appear in front of
the judge they worked to elect (or defeat). For example, a recent study showed
that nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2008
and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm that contributed to the
campaign of at least one of the justices.8o Even if that number is an aberration,
surely the people and groups with the most interest in judicial elections are those
who are most likely to appear in front of the judges. Requiring judges to recuse in
such circumstances would unduly burden the courts and create opportunities for
campaign contributors to game the system by offering contributions to judges
perceived as unfavorable to their side."
If Caperton is not about appearances, but instead about the probability of
actual bias, the case becomes much more difficult. What is the likelihood of
actual bias when a litigant's CEO spends his own money on a judge's campaign?
Would an offer of a campaign contribution, or a contribution too small to have
made any difference in the outcome of the election, create an undue risk of
bias?12 Whatever the answers to these questions, the recusal analysis is much
more complicated when focus is shifted away from an appearance of bias and
towards a probability of bias.83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 248 n.65 (discussing Jewish law's recognition of a judge's potential propensity toward
bias).
79. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial
Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1087-88 (2010); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 164 (2004).
80. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributions and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/contentlelert/campaign-
contributions.and_the.pennsylvania-supremecourt (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
81. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267-69 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(expressing this concern); see also Tuan Samahon, Caperton and Judicial Disqualification in Nevada, 17
NEVADA LAWYER 28 (Jan. 2010) (responding to the concern "that litigants and their counsel will 'game the
system' to obtain a preferred adjudicator by 'buying' disqualifications, i.e. by donating to disfavored judicial
candidates.").
82. The Supreme Court suggested that these circumstances would not rise to the level of a due process
violation when it explained that "[niot every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a
probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal." Id. at 2263.
83. Of course, even if the due-process disqualification standard is based on the probability of actual bias,
most judges are still required to recuse based on the non-constitutional appearance-of-bias test contained in the
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IV. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AND DUE PROCESS: IS PROCEDURAL RECUSAL
REFORM THE ANSWER?
Adopting a probability-based recusal standard rather than an appearance-
based standard raises another important question: What procedures are
appropriate for recusal? It is a question that is rarely asked-when it comes to
recusal, procedure is often ignored." In fact, while substantive recusal standards
have undergone significant transformation in the last few centuries as the
public's view and understanding of the judiciary have changed, recusal
procedures have remained stagnant. For example, neither 28 U.S.C. § 455 nor the
judicial codes adopted by the states set out guidelines for what procedures should
be followed in the event disqualification is sought. In Caperton, the Court had an
opportunity to address the issue and prescribe certain procedures, but it declined
to do so. It is time for a fresh approach, one where disqualification procedures
under the Due Process Clause are tailored to the substantive recusal standards set
forth by the Supreme Court in Caperton, so that they reflect the modem
understanding of judicial bias and the judicial role.
There are three reasons why new procedures for disqualification are
necessary under the Due Process Clause and Caperton's probability-of-bias
recusal test. First, recusal procedures must be tailored to the substantive standard
for judicial disqualification. Caperton's new substantive standard calls for a
consideration of a new procedure at the very least, and it may even require it.
Second, eliminating the role of appearances in the substantive disqualification
standard under the Due Process Clause requires an increased emphasis on
appearances in the disqualification procedures. Third, to give Caperton some
teeth, states must address the corrosive effect of campaign contributions on
judicial impartiality. The best way to do so, however, is not by eliminating
judicial elections altogether, but by revising the disqualification procedures to
limit the potential corrupting influence of money.
A. Tailoring Recusal Procedures to Caperton's Probability-Based Recusal
Standard
Scholars commenting on judicial disqualification rarely ask whether existing
disqualification procedures are appropriate for the substantive standard. 5 As a
result, while substantive recusal standards have gradually evolved in response to
judicial controversies, recusal procedure has remained stagnant. One such
federal disqualification statute and the Code of Judicial Conduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 19.
84. See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53
U. KAN. L. REv. 531 (2005).
85. Recent scholarship, however, has finally begun to pay attention to recusal procedures. See id. at 535
(calling for the incorporation of the core tenets of legal process theory into recusal law).
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procedure dictates that the very judge who is being asked to disqualify himself
makes the disqualification decision, often without any written decision and
subject to minimal appellate review." Thus, one must ask whether the Supreme
Court's pronouncement of a probability-based substantive disqualification rule
calls for a new, concordant procedure.
This Article posits that it does. For appearance-based recusal standards
imposed by the federal disqualification statutes and the Code of Judicial Conduct,
current recusal procedures (whereby a judge decides his own recusal motion)
may be defensible, at least in theory. After all, in conducting the appearance-of-
bias inquiry, the judge determines whether a member of the public would
perceive the judge to be biased. Whatever the problems with an appearance-
based recusal standard-it is imprecise, 7 it allows parties to flippantly accuse a
judge of misconduct," and it may lead to over-recusal"-at the very least it is the
type of inquiry that judges traditionally engage in and are generally very good
at.'
An appearance-driven recusal standard also presents a judge with the
opportunity to avoid hearing the case without admitting any actual bias or
impropriety. While this may be problematic in-itself," at least it makes recusal
easier to stomach for some judges.
But for the probability-based recusal standard established in Caperton-one
that focuses on the likelihood that a judge is biased-self-recusal makes little
sense. How can a biased judge, one that arguably owes one of the litigants a
"debt of gratitude" for getting him elected, decide whether there is a probability
of a bias in a given situation? Most people would agree that he cannot.2 The
86. Norman L. Greene, How Great Is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry Into the
Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial Elections, and
Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 904 (2010) ("[A]ppellate courts
typically affirm denials of recusal, and the burden of proof to be met by the party seeking recusal is
substantial.").
87. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA
Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2006).
88. Id.
89. Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit ofActual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
90. In a tort case, for example, a judge may consider how a reasonable person would have acted in a
certain situation. In a libel case, the judge determines whether plaintiffs interpretation of the allegedly
defamatory phrase is reasonable.
91. Arguably, allowing judges to make recusal decisions based on mere appearances-on the
perceptions of the "average person"-is nothing more than a fig leaf-a shield behind which judges can hide in
order to avoid acknowledging that judges are human and are subject to bias and prejudice. Of course, using an
appearance-based recusal standard, judges can pretend that actual judicial bias is not a problem and that recusal
is necessary only because the public perceives a problem, not because there actually is a problem.
92. Professor Geyh, in his response to this Article, suggests that mine is a distinction without a
difference and that self-recusal is equally problematic regardless of the substantive standard. While I tend to
believe, for the reasons already described, that the difference indeed matters, my proposal also has the benefit of
allowing states to make a piecemeal procedural change, limited only to disqualification motions under the Due
Process Clause. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection, Judicial Disqualification, and the Role of Money in
Judicial Campaigns, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85 (2010).
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same incentives that may lead a judge to favor one side on the merits may create
an incentive for that same judge to find against recusal. Implementing procedural
changes that address this problem will not only help foster fairness and
impartiality in the judiciary, but it will also increase the public's confidence in
the appearance of justice.3
B. Keeping Appearances Relevant
The Supreme Court's rejection of an appearance-based substantive recusal
standard does not mean that appearances should play no role in our recusal
jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause.' In fact, appearances should
continue to play a central role because of the importance of the appearance of
impartiality to the judiciary. Take, for example, those nations where court rulings
carry no weight and are routinely ignored.95 Judges, lacking both electoral
legitimacy and political force, depend in large part on the public's acceptance of
their authority." For the sake of self-preservation and to maintain their own
legitimacy, courts should protect their reputation from public outrage and
rejection. As Justice Stevens has said, "[i]t is confidence in the men and women
who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law."97
Therefore, the public's perception of the fairness and impartiality of the courts is
relevant to any discussion of recusal. 8
But questions remain as to precisely what role appearances should play. If
appearance of bias is not the determining factor in judicial disqualification under
the Due Process Clause, how should appearances be considered and who should
consider them? This Article suggests that state legislatures, rather than
93. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DuKE L.J. 703, 734 (1994); James
L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23
LAW. & Soc'Y REV. 469, 471 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional
Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 621, 621-22 (1991).
94. Some scholars have sought to eliminate the role that appearances play in recusal analysis. For
example, Professor Sarah Cravens has argued that an appearance-based recusal standard results in too many
unnecessary recusals. Cravens, supra note 89, at 2-3. In her view, recusal rules should not be about promoting
public confidence but about the elimination of bias. Id. She proposes that so long as judges are able to
adequately explain their rulings, appearance should not play a role in recusal. Id. Similarly, Professor Ronald
Rotunda has argued that the appearance-based recusal standards are too imprecise and make it too easy for
litigants to seek a judge's recusal. Rotunda, supra note 87. He too argues in favor of abandoning an appearance-
based recusal standard. Id.
95. JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE ix (1974).
96. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged By Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60
Stan. L. Rev. 155, 171 (2007).
97. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Cf. Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 236, 267 (1978) (identifying the importance of "a judicial system that not only is impartial in fact,
but also appears to render disinterested justice").
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challenged judges, should consider appearances in creating ex ante rules-
procedural guidelines-that would control judicial disqualification. These
disqualification procedures should be designed to foster not only judicial
impartiality, but also the public's confidence in the courts. In other words, in
adopting new procedures for judicial disqualification, states must ensure that the
procedures create an appearance of impartiality and fairness. Empirical research
is necessary to determine precisely what those procedures may be," but there are
at least two rules that states must adopt: (a) a rule requiring a different judge or
an impartial panel to rule on a disqualification motion; and (b) a rule requiring
publication of an opinion explaining the rationale for a disqualification decision.
If appearances are going to play any role in our recusal jurisprudence under the
Due Process Clause, that role should be in the recusal procedures adopted by the
states to address future Caperton motions.
C. Making Caperton Matter
Finally, there is yet another reason why the Court's adoption of a probability-
based recusal standard under the Due Process Clause should lead to procedural
reform. Because Caperton adopts a less stringent recusal standard than was
already in place in most states (see Parts II & III), Caperton itself is largely
irrelevant unless states voluntarily make procedural changes to their
disqualification practices. Undoubtedly, after Caperton, states should not leave
the recusal decision to the challenged judge, and a number of states have
grappled with making such changes to their recusal rules. If states combine
Caperton's substantive probability-of-bias standard with a more aggressive
procedural approach, the combination could increase in the public's confidence
in the courts.
On the other hand, states need not scrap or revise their current recusal rules
altogether. The procedural changes proposed in this Article may only be
necessary in the context of judicial elections, and only to address those problems,
like those in Caperton, that are associated with the role of money in judicial
campaigns. When it comes to judicial disqualification, lawyers and judges tend to
think of bias as one monolithic category that should be addressed with a
homogenous recusal standard. But there need not be one solution for all types of
bias. and sometimes minor alterations with a scalpel will yield much better
results than large-scale changes with a sledgehammer. When it comes to
impartiality, election-related bias is very important and should be addressed by
procedural changes, even if the same recusal procedures are retained in other,
non-Caperton contexts. After all, empirical research suggests that judges who
receive contributions from litigants may in fact be more likely to possess actual
99. For example, further studies are necessary to determine what effect requiring other judges or
independent panels to make disqualification decisions has on public confidence and perception of impartiality.
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bias,'" and that the public is truly concerned about the impartiality of elected
judges.o' This may be a good reason to treat recusal in the election context
differently than other types of recusal (as when a judge presides over a case
involving a former colleague). Large-scale procedural changes for all recusal
motions may be a superior solution, but this is a good place to start.
Procedural changes are most crucial in the context of judicial elections and
due-process challenges of the kind seen in Caperton. Today, nearly eighty
percent of Americans believe that elected judges are biased towards their
contributors. 02 As a result, there is a movement, headed in part by former
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, to eliminate state judicial elections
altogether.'a Professor Meryl Chertoff' s article included in this Symposium
echoes the calls for the end of judicial elections.'0 But eliminating judicial
elections is the wrong approach to alleviating this concern: Despite the perceived
problems with judicial elections, the public still favors them and judicial
elections remain extremely popular.'05 Thus, rather than seeking to eliminate
judicial elections, states should.begin implementing reforms that will address the
problem, starting with recusal reform.' And that reform begins with changes in
recusal procedures for challenges under the Due Process Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
It is important for persons to see that judicial recusal is a key component in
the tug-of-war between judicial independence and judicial accountability.
Although judicial bias and recusal have always been issues of considerable
importance, recusal has recently taken on an even greater importance that
demands immediate attention. As judicial elections become "noisier, nastier and
100. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623 (2009)
(finding a "strong relationship between campaign contributions and judges' rulings" and demonstrating that
elected judges "routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and campaign money"); Margaret S. Williams &
Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Attorneys' Contributions on State Supreme Courts, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002).
101. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52 (2003).
102. See id. (explaining that while eighty percent of the public favors judicial elections, a similar
number of people believes that elected judges are influenced towards their campaign contributors).
103. See Tony Mauro, Reformers Hope High Court Decision Will Kill Judicial Elections, LAW.cOM,
Feb. 1, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202439680529 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
104. Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends in Judicial Elections in the States, 42 McGEORGE L. REV. 47 (2010).
105. Id.
106. Election reform is also important, although the Court's decision in Republican Party v. White and
Citizens United v. FEC may limit states' options. Some states, including West Virginia, have recently started
experimenting with public financing for judicial elections, although the constitutionality of such measures
remains in question. See THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECrIONS, 2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE 4
(2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/dO91dc91 lbd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
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costlier,"'07 recusal reform becomes more and more important. In fact, it may be
one of the best ways to retain the judicial elections that the public
overwhelmingly supports while addressing the impartiality concerns and the
corrupting influence of money that are inevitable in an elected judiciary. But the
time for recusal reform is now. Public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary is diminishing, and people are rightly concerned about the impartiality
of their courts. The public does not believe that elected judges can remain
impartial when either a litigant or an attorney contributes significant amounts of
money (perhaps even any money) to a judge's election campaign. Even judges
themselves are unsure that their colleagues can be impartial when deciding cases
involving those who helped get them elected.'08
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White and Citizens United v. FEC, judicial elections look more
and more like legislative elections. Thus, recusal reform may be the best way-or
perhaps the only way-to deal with the appearance of partiality that can be
created by large campaign contributions to a judge in the course of an election. It
is time for a new generation of recusal reform-one that is focused on reforming
stagnant disqualification procedures rather than substantive rules.
This Article proposed three procedural reforms that would respond directly
to Caperton. First, states should tailor the recusal procedure to the substantive
recusal standard. This means that a recusal procedure that worked for one
substantive rule may not work for a different rule. Second, because the Supreme
Court's decision in Caperton limited the role of appearance in the substantive
disqualification standard, states must put greater emphasis on the appearance of
fairness in developing disqualification procedures that will satisfy the Due
Process Clause. Finally, states should feel free to create different recusal
procedures for different factual situations. In other words, rather than following a
single procedure every time a litigant seeks disqualification of a judge, states
may create more stringent recusal procedures specifically for circumstances
raising due-process concerns, as in Caperton.
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